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Mature Industrial The Realities of
Communities: Reindustrialization
Jeanne H. Armstrong and John R. Mullin
This article analyzes the reindustrialization problems facing mature-industry commu-
nities in Massachusetts. The findings are based upon our planning consulting work and
research projects involving forty cities and towns. The range of these communities
includes those which have recovered, are on their way to recovery, and are stable;
those which are declining; and those whose status is indeterminate. A variety offactors
are reviewed, including unionization; work-force characteristics; the relationship
between small and large plants; the characteristics of local companies; location;
financing; the availability of land; and the role of local planning. Finally, we present
recommendations concerning local action and possible state-policy initiatives.
The purpose of this article is to explain the realities of planning for the mainte-
nance, enhancement, and expansion of the industrial base of mature-industry
cities and towns. Our conclusions are predicated on our work in forty mature-industry
communities in Massachusetts, and our findings were derived from three types of
studies. The first was applied planning consulting, which we used in cities and towns
across the Commonwealth; in these communities we relied primarily on local data,
interviews, and reports for our analysis and recommendations. The second was the
formal application of a questionnaire (see Appendix B), which we gave to more than
150 owners of small businesses in six mature-industry communities; this questionnaire
was utilized in both contractual and grant-funded work. The third was an examination
of the reindustrialization efforts of several communities as part of ongoing academic
research. This research is being undertaken with the intent of determining the effec-
tiveness of locally stimulated efforts, and more complete results will be published at a
later time. (The means by which each community was researched are noted in
Appendix A.)
When we began our work, we did not intend to summarize the findings of the
various studies and projects in a research report. For this reason, the findings do not
flow from one neat, methodological package that can be statistically aggregated. In
fact, even when we wrote formal survey instruments that were designed to assess
entrepreneurial activity, our clients inevitably asked for revisions and the posing of
questions tailored to local needs. Applying the old adage that the client is always right,
we reluctantly complied! In short, we took the findings from all three types of studies
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and summarized them herein.
The communities listed in Appendix A all have differing characteristics and are
experiencing various levels of industrial prosperity or problems. Some have completely
recovered (for example, Maynard and Milford); some are stable (Northampton and
Templeton); some are in the process of recovering (Chicopee and Lawrence); some are
declining (Adams and North Adams); and some have an indeterminate future (Colrain
and Monroe). What do we mean by these descriptions? A community that has com-
pletely recovered is one in which the mills, factories, and plants are in active use for
industrial purposes; where unemployment is low; and where industrial activities appear
to be relatively prosperous. A stable community is one that has a strong industrial
base; where long-term industrial tenants remain prosperous; and where this industrial
activity is still welcomed. A community that is in the process of recovering is marked
by strong promotional activity that has met with some success, and is being visited by
firms interested in locating therein. A community in decline has had little success in
attracting new firms and is quite likely to experience further industrial decline. A com-
munity with an indeterminate future is one in which the industrial base no longer exists
and in which the factors that once attracted industry to it are no longer operative.
In each case, we attempted to extract information concerning nine factors (deter-
mined by trial and error) which we felt were critical to the well-being of the com-
munity. These were as follows:
1. The role of unions. In general, we found that the more unionized the
community, the more apt it was to be in decline.
2. The characteristics of the work force. Not surprisingly, the less edu-
cated, less skilled, older, and more unionized workers were more apt to
be located in a community beset by decline than those who were more
educated, more skilled, younger, and less apt to work in unionized
firms.
3. The relationship between large and small plants. We found that small is
not beautiful— in a vacuum. Rather, there is a strong relationship be-
tween the success of small plants and large factories. A layoff of work-
ers at United Technologies, for example, sends ripples quickly through
many communities and adversely impacts small feeder firms.
4. The characteristics of local companies. Our analysis clearly showed that
the success of these companies depends upon their skills with respect to
management, obtaining financing, marketing, and creating innovative
products.
5. Location. The oft-quoted statement that the three key characteristics
determining site selection are location, location, and location is only
partly true. Clearly, the success of the Route 495 communities stems
from their proximity to the highway. Yet other communities have expe-
rienced great success despite their being located off the beaten path.
6. Education and training. While these factors are important in growth
areas, they are problematic in others. How can education and training
be provided in advance for a company that has not yet located in a
given community? There is no easy answer.
7. The role of banks and venture capital. In some cases, banks have been
aggressive in their efforts to stimulate industrial growth, while in others
they have tended to invest outside the region. It is certain, however, that
starter industries tend not to be supported by local banks.
8. The availability of land. If a town had land that was (a) available, (b)
appropriately zoned, (c) served by an infrastructure, (d) close to high-
ways, (e) free from environmental problems, and (f) relatively inexpen-
sive, then, over time, it tended to attract new industry— albeit at a
slower pace than most communities desired, and rarely with the boost
to the local economic base that was expected.
9. The notion of planning itself. Professionalism, long-range approaches,
governmental assistance, and organization were found to be very impor-
tant. The community that was carefully planned, organized, and profes-
sional tended to have a greater degree of recovery than those with weak,
hit-or-miss approaches.
Overview
Over the past decade, New England in general and Massachusetts in particular have
benefited from a dramatic shift in their economic base. Slowly but steadily, the region
has shed its traditional mature-industry firms and replaced them with the glittering
growth firms associated largely with high technology. 1 In Massachusetts, the change
has been so dramatic that the Commonwealth has had the lowest unemployment rate
among the nation's ten largest industrial states for the past three years. During calendar
year 1984, the state saw more jobs created (140,000) in any one year since 1942. This
is in striking contrast to circumstances of ten years ago, when the unemployment rate
in Massachusetts was the highest in the nation and the state was functionally bankrupt.
The changes in the past decade have been phenomenal indeed.2
What has brought about these changes? There are many causes, and no one simple
determinant stands out. Certainly, a number of factors have been critical: the rise of
the computer industry; increased technological innovation; the presence of risk capital;
the availability of a skilled labor force; entrepreneurship; educational achievement; and
supportive state policies. These collectively have formed a cauldron from which a
transformation appears to have emerged.3
Once we strip away the agglomerating effects of the state data, however, we can see
that the reindustrialization that has occurred has been very uneven. For example, the
overwhelming number of growth-related jobs are located along Routes 128 and 495;
there are whole regions of the state— that is, the Northern Tier along Route 2 (the
Northern Tier refers to the set of communities that lie along the Route 2/Mohawk Trail
corridor); southeastern Massachusetts; and the Blackstone Valley— which have bene-
fited very little. The state has recognized this imbalance, has formed a mature-indus-
tries council to study the problem, and is now taking steps to help communities adjust
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(one such effort is the Cooperative Regional Industrial Laboratory). The fact remains
that some regions of the Commonwealth are still dependent upon faltering mature
industries.4
What are the characteristics of the mature-industry towns? From our research, it ap-
pears that in contrast to other areas of the state, the workers in these communities are
older, more unionized, more ethnic, less educated, less skilled, and less able or willing
to move, and that they are more predominantly Catholic and have larger families. The
work ethic is powerful, and so are family, church, and roots. Voting with one's feet—
by moving to the Sun Belt, for example— simply is not considered an option. Most of
these towns are small (averaging about ten thousand people); were once affluent, or at
least healthy; and are located on the fringes of metropolitan areas. Their surviving
companies are a mix of multinationals; large, privately owned firms; and a plethora of
contract shops that depend on the largesse of the large firms. Management and workers
in these communities tend not to get along. If the preceding characterization creates an
image of communities that have stood fast in time, then the description is an accurate
one. There are more than seventy communities across Massachusetts which fit this
profile. It is within this type of community that we focused most of our work.
Summary of Key Initial Findings
What follows is a summary of the major points that must be faced to deal with the
problems of mature-industry communities in Massachusetts.5
1. The union label is the "kiss of death." Any small town that has the image of being
pro-union will not be considered as a prime location alternative by an expanding or
relocating company. If a town has experienced recent strike actions, particularly over
work rules, the likelihood of a company moving there is lessened even further. Virtu-
ally none of the growth-oriented companies are union, and there is a strong desire to
keep things that way.6
What are the implications of this? There are several. First, communities marked as
unlikely candidates by expanding or relocating companies are less likely to recover
quickly. Second, communities will have to promote the positive side of their union
work forces (that is, hard work, loyalty, organizational abilities). Third, the social
structure in the community will change. No longer will the shop steward or the nego-
tiating team have favored status, and no longer will the union hall serve as the nerve
center of the community. In summary, we have found that unions in these communities
are declining in power and influence, and we saw no evidence of their resurgence in
any of the towns that we examined.
2. The small town cannot hold on to the past. In town after town, we have seen the
collapse of textile, shoe, furniture, and machine tool plants. In each case, there is the
inevitable meeting in the union hall, with discussions about "local purchase," "worker
owned," or finding a new owner for the business. The workers get fired up; organize;
obtain assistance from the Economic Development Agency (EDA), the Small Business
Administration (SBA), and the state; and begin to operate. Inevitably, the work force
shrinks, wages fall, benefits are cut, layoffs become frequent, and requests for tax
abatement increase. This cycle can repeat itself for years.7 And as it does, the young, the
educated, and the ambitious leave.8 The net result is that the longer a community holds
10
on to the past, the longer it takes to revive. In short, employment in textiles, shoes,
and heavy manufacturing will not be returning to our region.9 Also, while we all like
to hear about the success stories, such as Weirton, West Virginia, the fact remains that
local buy-outs and worker-owned companies are beset with many of the same problems
that confronted the former management structure. 10 Competition from Singapore or
Brazil, where workers earn a dollar an hour, will continue to be a problem even if
workers cut their wages from $12.00 to $6.00 an hour.11
We do see some changes occurring, however. For example, a recently completed
report on the future of the Northern Tier called for increased attention to the mating of
the furniture trades in greater Gardner with high-technology applications, the premise
being that high technology can make these firms more competitive.12 Our own work in
Leominster, which focused on the future of the city's plastics industry, calls for a formal
relationship between the University of Massachusetts Polymer Center, the University of
Lowell Applied Plastics Center, and local plastics manufacturers.13 Again, the intent is
to increase the viability of mature industries through the use of high technology.
3. The mature-industry town will increasingly become a two-tiered community. The
real wage level of our mature-industry towns is shrinking. In fact, the laid-off former
union worker, once he finds work again (in our research area, this worker is rarely a
she), earns approximately one-half to two-thirds of the union scale. As the blue-collar
middle-income group shrinks and that worker slips to lower-middle-income status, the
entire community in which he resides suffers a loss of expendable income.14 Also, the
psychological and social split between blue collar and white collar tends to become
worse. This trend toward a greater discrepancy between the two groups of wage earners
is exacerbated by the surge in the service sector, which has created some highly paid
professional positions along with many jobs that pay much less.
The only saving grace in this shift is that spouses have often returned to work to
make up the difference in lost pay. Thus, in terms of the income levels of the tradi-
tional family, the loss in pay has often been softened. However, several of the bankers
who were interviewed as part of this research commented on the ambivalent state of
these two-income families. They noted that yes, these families can qualify for a mort-
gage or a loan. But they also noted that almost invariably one of the jobs is in a weak
firm, or the wife is of child-bearing age (and firms in which the wives work provide
little in terms of maternity leave or medical assistance). What will happen in these
families if a pregnancy occurs or if the economy at large weakens?
4. Most displaced mature-industry workers— at least the younger ones— do find
some kind ofjob. The unemployment figures do not demonstrate that towns where
mature industries exist are dramatically better or worse off than communities where
high technology and service firms predominate. At the same time, these figures do not
reflect the early retirees and the long-term unemployed who have given up and dropped
out. Generally speaking, most displaced mature-industry workers can find a job with
lower pay and benefits, less dignity, less stature, and less security. 15
We also found that workers are traveling greater distances to obtain work. This is a
function of better roads (such as Route 146 through the Blackstone Valley), cheaper fuel
costs, and the possibility of finding a job within reasonable commuting range. For
example, although Athol's economic recovery has been slow, its unemployment has
declined dramatically as firms in Leominster— which has a booming economy and
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which is located approximately twenty miles to the east— have been providing subsi-
dized buses for commuting back and forth to Athol.16
5. Mature-industry communities are often Dickensian. Firms wishing to have an
image that evokes the Golden Triangle, the Austin Center, or Silicon Valley do not
locate in Building 26 of the former American Woolen Company or on the eighth floor
of the Uniroyal building. Sites of this kind are often too big, are not laid out for
current production methods, and are too expensive to bring up to code. Frequently,
they are white elephants.17
Mature-industry communities face the problem of maintaining their facilities in a
habitable condition. We noted that mill owners who continue to maintain their proper-
ties, despite high vacancy rates, are more likely to find a reuse for them. Owners who
shut off the heat, disconnect the sprinklers, and fail to mothball their properties find
that within a short time, all they have left are piles of brick. We don't know what will
happen to these structures in the future, but we do know that the new tax law will
remove the advantages of holding on to properties that are poor investments. At the
same time, the law may hasten demolition before new investors can be found. The
issue will be particularly critical in such communities as North Adams (the Sprague
Works), Adams (the Arnold Print Works), Ludlow (the Ludlow Mill), Colrain (the
Kendall Mill), and Ware (the Ware Millyard). These structures are all vacant or
underutilized and are critical to their communities' future.18
6. Local banks rarely can or do take risks. This is a major problem for mature-
industry communities. Many banks tend to invest outside their own community, favoring
instead more lucrative investments, for example, second houses on Cape Cod. Many are
also increasingly hampered by their status as branch banks: major decisions are now
made in Boston. The result is that local banks are usually not risk takers and are more
apt to err on the side of caution than to be bullish with respect to young entrepreneurs.19
On the other hand, some local bankers relate a contrasting view. In regions where
the population has declined and the local economy is still on a downward slide, bank
presidents will report in closed session that there are now too many banks per capita.
They maintain that there is capital available and that they are competing to invest. The
problem is the depressing economic malaise, which results in no good ideas and no
sound entrepreneurial ventures to. invest in.20 Local bankers also point out the reluc-
tance on the part of entrepreneurs to prepare business plans that have sufficient depth
to be meaningful. They regularly refer to the figures on starter company failures, noting
that the stronger the plan, the more successful the company is likely to be. Our research
has consistently found that the owners of young, small firms lack the critical skills
necessary to obtain financing. Using "mom's mattress money" seems to be a far easier
solution than working with the local banker.
7. Mature-industry towns often suffer from paternalism. In one of the communities
we studied, the town fathers customarily refused to pass any budget-approval measures
until they had first checked the plan with the mill owner. In another community, the
mill owner (of a high-technology plant at that!) had for years blocked any company
from coming into the region for fear of labor competition leading to raised wage rates.
Now this owner has retired, and his son is moving the plant and twelve hundred jobs
out of the region.21
12
8. The aid that has been provided by federal and state government is too little, too
late. The SBA, EDA, and Trade Adjustment Act grants and emergency relief funds are
well meaning and often helpful, as are state aid programs. Unfortunately, the funds
have been too long in coming, and they are too limited. In the communities we exam-
ined, few faltering companies have been kept afloat— even after obtaining help from
these sources. The Chrysler and Lockheed cases may be glamorous big wins, but for
the 250-person paper factory, for example, the odds against such a favorable outcome
are very great.22 Even the much-praised efforts of the Dukakis administration are not
as fruitful as they would first appear to be. Yes, the efforts can succeed, and yes, the
state has benefited. However, it is important to note that the most distressed areas of
the state have not been turned around as a direct result of public help. Perhaps what
this signifies, more than anything else, is that there are limits to government, that
administrative policies and programs can only establish a foundation for action, and
that only when an industry is interested in a community will government aid be help-
ful. Bluntly stated, no matter what the state government does, the decision to locate in
a community is inherently outside the public realm.
9. More mature industries will close over the next decade than did during the last.
We base this prediction on several factors: international competition will increase;
current plants and equipment are becoming increasingly outmoded; many plants are
industrial polluters; and there are locational disadvantages.23 Recent data released by
the U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics show that manufacturing of nondefense products in
Massachusetts is declining at a rapid rate.24 Will this trend change? There are some
indications that a strong manufacturing base will continue to exist in the state. However,
it will be dramatically smaller, less unionized, more technologically advanced, and less
labor intensive, and its products will be "weight light and value heavy." 25 The image of
hordes of blue-collar workers leaving the Foster Grant, Sprague, Union Butterfield,
Uniroyal, and Greenfield Tap and Die factories after a day's work still exists in many
of our cities and towns. It is an image, however, that will be altered to reflect the new-
industrial workplace.
10. Industrial planning is virtually nonexistent at both the regional and local levels.
Where industrial planning does exist, it is of a chamber of commerce genre and is not
based upon any needs assessment, understanding of local conditions, or evaluation of
what the market will bear. We found that where so-called industrial planning existed, it
was actually industrial promotion; that is, it was oriented toward enticing the new firm
into the community, while virtually ignoring the needs of existing firms.26
Overriding Conclusions
The mature-industry town, by demographics, by educational perspective, by spirit, by
age profile, and by physical facilities, is a special breed— one that needs to be carefully
nurtured if it is to survive. What is required to ensure its survival? Having pondered
this question in both our research and applied planning studies, we arrived at the
following major conclusions.
1. There is an urgent need for professionalism among local industrial planners. The
great majority of mature-industry communities in Massachusetts are small- to medium-
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sized New England mill towns, and Massachusetts is still the land of the citizen volun-
teer official. Thus, in town after town, the day-to-day management and administration,
as well as long-range planning functions, are left to boards of selectmen, planning
boards, conservation commissions, and other citizen volunteers who meet on Tuesday
nights. Zoning ordinances, budgets, long-range investing in capital improvements, all
must be approved at the town meeting.
In regard to planning, the situation is only slightly better in the larger communities,
where there is a mayor and city council or similar form of government. The aftermath
of the Proposition 2Vi tax cap featured drastic cutbacks in personnel in many towns,
and the planning staff were among the first to go.27 This situation is exemplified by the
status of infrastructure planning in the small cities and towns of Massachusetts. Even
those few communities which on the eve of Proposition 2 Vi had carefully formulated
capital improvement plans and schedules for improvement and replacement have found,
in the ensuing five years, that they have had to shelve those plans in light of reduced
annual budgets, limited staffing, and deteriorated equipment.28 Other communities have
balanced their budgets through the drastic reduction and reorganization of departments.
Across small-town Massachusetts, there is a new category of town official: the DPW
head who woke up one morning to find himself in charge of cemeteries, water systems,
public buildings, sewers, and— because Massachusetts law requires a tree warden—
trees. When researchers come to town to study local planning, it is this person to
whom they are referred for information, so apparently he is also in charge of certain
aspects of planning! 29
In short, in most Massachusetts mature-industry communities, the responsibility for
critical aspects of planning falls to officials who are not trained in planning. They are
dedicated, hardworking, and community-minded, but lack the expertise required to
guide the future form of community development.
In light of the unquestionable need to do something about the local economic situa-
tion, private-sector leaders are in many cases trying to fill the void. However, the
members of a local chamber of commerce are no more likely to have had occasion to
master the tools of industrial development than is the harassed, overworked official.
There is an emerging potential for public/private collaborative economic-development
efforts, and local officials and business leaders will be the key players in bringing
about the implementation of long-range plans. But there is a crying need for professional
planning services to crystallize objectives, lay out options for action, and help map out
specific implementation steps. Indeed, one of the first questions that professional
planners must help communities address is whether local economic development is to
include ^industrialization.30 In a town where the bulk of the work force is trained for
industrial production but the mills have closed down, the attitude toward industry is
often categorized as a love/hate relationship.
2. Mature-industry communities must heed the admonition to "know thyself." Local
communities are seriously hampered by inadequate information about their town's re-
sources, problems, and prospects. Lack of data is not the problem: local decision makers
are engulfed in torrents of aggregated data and analyses of macro trends. Undigestible
piles of generalized information and printed materials are available from uncounted
agencies and programs.31 Absent is information that is specific to the community as
well as the analysis of what the available data imply for short- and long-term planning.32
Thanks to the U.S. Census, town census, and street listings, demographic data are
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available; what is missing is the interpretation of these data. However, hard data on
existing firms and the current and future work force are another matter. For example,
statistics from the Department of Employment Security (DED) have severe limitations.
They do not reflect self-employed people or workers who have exhausted their benefits,
have given up searching for a job, and have dropped out of the full-time employment
market. Moreover, for many small communities, disaggregated DES data are not
released, because the number of firms reflected is so small that to disaggregate the
data is to violate confidentiality. Local sources of information, both formal and
informal, often do not even know the identity of firms that may offer potential for the
future, that is, the young enterprises located in garages, basements, and back sections
of buildings which are likely to be in violation of both building codes and zoning regu-
lations. Finally, crucial information is also lacking with respect to better-known, estab-
lished firms; despite all the theoretical and policy debates, there still is no practical
early-warning system to alert local and state officials to upcoming cutbacks, closures,
or departures of the mature firms that are the backbone of the local economy.33
What about the members of the local work force? What are their skills and attitudes?
Do they have the willingness to train, and other attributes upon which reindustrializa-
tion strategies can be based? We know that they are loyal to and rooted in the com-
munity. Individuals who would leave in search of greener pastures already have.34 The
most troublesome questions and difficult issues confronting reindustrialization planners
are those which pertain to the wrenching present and uncertain future faced by today's
industrial work force, which may in fact be yesterday's industrial work force. The
decline of the worker's union, the recognition that the worker's skills are no longer
required, the fact that many of these once-proud individuals are now dependent on
government, and the lack of knowledge concerning entrepreneurship are factors that
can indeed lead to extensive stress.35 There are no pat answers, but certainly generating
as much "hard data" as possible about a community's work force and then correlating
those data with more subjective considerations, such as perceptions of the future and
commitment to the community, will be an important first step toward documenting the
current and future human resources that will infuse life into a reindustrialization
program.
Most industrial communities either have or have access to general information re-
garding their physical resources and facilities. For example, with a little time and
effort, one can assemble a listing of available industrial buildings and developable land;
the Soil Conservation Service and Regional Planning Commissions have at least some
base data on soils, water, and agricultural land; and the extent of sewer and water
services is known, although not necessarily mapped. The crucial missing links lie in
the interpretation of that information and what it implies for reindustrialization. The
state of local infrastructure planning is a good case in point. The cost of providing
utilities for future industrial activity is very difficult to assess in a town where the
water and sewer monitoring and maintenance program consists of fixing the pipe when
it bursts. When there are 100 miles of road to maintain but a budget for patching only
5 of those miles in a given year, the DPW does not maintain and update a survey of
road-surface condition.36
Local and regional planning must also address the question of how reindustrialization
relates to the natural resource base. Traditionally, the state's mature-industry towns
accepted the tenants of their mills with little regard for the companies' impact on the
environment. This is no longer possible. Federal and state regulations and controls
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concerning wetlands, flood areas, waste treatment, water sources, and particulates
placed in the atmosphere, to name a few areas of concern, now help to ensure that the
environmental quality of such historical mill rivers as the Nashua, Blackstone, Hoosic,
Assabet, and Merrimack is being restored. As well, the physical image of the state's
towns is critically important. Massachusetts farms, town commons, and mill complexes
nestled in valleys are all quality-of-life resources that have kept oldtimers in the state
and have enticed newcomers to reside here. The loss of these resources as the price for
job generation will hurt all Massachusetts residents in the long term. In brief, reindus-
trialization cannot take place at the expense of natural resources. The two need not be
mutually exclusive, but reindustrialization planners must generate the necessary
specific local data; must bring to bear the most effective planning tools; and then must
convince the local population that reindustrialization will not destroy natural resources,
that it will augment, not detract from, their quality of life.
Industrial communities must take a fresh look at the local capacity to finance reindus-
trialization. We see strong indications that both public- and private-sector ability to
underwrite capitalization may be greater than perceived. Across Massachusetts, the
bonding capacity of local towns far exceeds their bonded indebtedness, and many towns
have not even bothered to obtain a bond rating.37 Of course, the taxpayers' revolt is one
significant reason for this state of affairs, but it is also true that many small towns are
closed out of the bond market because they lack the technical expertise necessary to
process a bond. For example, a town in western Massachusetts was considering a
$500,000 bond but was concerned about the associated legal and other fees it would
have to pay. These costs would have amounted to $10,000, a relatively minor sum but
one that would have been very difficult to pass at the town meeting in light of current
budgetary constraints. There are also untapped private local sources of industrial
financing. Frequently, local banks have a poor reputation in regard to making loans to
new businesses; but close questioning often reveals that this perception has resulted in
the entrepreneur's not preparing a strong loan application or even in his or her not
going to the bank at all. The actual and potential roles of local private capital must be
examined further, but the expertise and support of the heads of local lending institu-
tions must definitely be tapped during the formative stages of reindustrialization plan-
ning.38
Clearly, planning for reindustrialization requires gathering and analyzing data that
pertain to the assets and liabilities of such categories as land, labor, location, capital,
services, and physical resources. At the same time, there is an overarching need for a
reassertion, or perhaps redefinition, of the community's character. What are the inherent
and fundamental characteristics of the community which will be the essential compo-
nents of its future? For many former mill towns, the issue of community character
raises such very real questions as, Do we want to retain a viable local industrial and
commercial base, or do we want to become a bedroom community? Towns located
farther from metropolitan centers must ask, Do we want to pin our hopes upon becom-
ing a tourist destination and center for factory outlets?
3. There is a need for balanced growth. A number of regional trends are altering the
physical setting and social fabric of New England industrial communities. Commuting
patterns, improved transportation networks, the rise of the service sector, and the ex-
ploding demand for housing are all enveloping former freestanding mill towns. The
same local citizen officials described earlier are confronted by such growth manage-
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ment issues as retention of farmland, conservation of open space, provision of afford-
able housing, pollution cleanup, and the job of relieving the strain on public utilities
and services. Reindustrialization planning must take place within this overall context of
growth management and must itself work to maintain a balance within the industrial
sector.
A spectrum of industrial buildings and developable land must be maintained. This
can be difficult when market forces are pressing to convert old mills into boutiques
and condominiums.39 "Banking" an old mill complex can be expensive; the heating bill
required to prevent deterioration can be in the hundreds of thousands of dollars for one
winter. Many New England communities have a limited number of land parcels that
have good access and are sizable, relatively flat, well drained, and served by sewer and
water; it is a struggle to stave off commercial or residential development and to wait
for suitable industrial development. This is a prime example of how successful reindus-
trialization will depend upon the forging of a consensus that industry is an essential
component of the community's character— one that the voting public wants to foster—
and that reindustrialization is a crucial element in the future for which the community
is striving. Conserving the region's industrial stock will be difficult and expensive, but
also vital to a reindustrialization effort. Mature firms, stabilizing firms, growing firms,
and firms aborning; research and development, production, management, and ware-
housing—all are essential to a vibrant industrial economy, and each has different
facilities requirements.40
A multifaceted approach is also required with respect to human resources. Retraining
and job-creation programs must assist the displaced older worker at the same time that
opportunities are created for the community's young people. The out-migration of the
younger generation is one of the most debilitating aspects of a depressed local economy.
An influx of innovation from outside the community must be welcomed, but care must
be taken that the efforts of local entrepreneurs are identified and fostered, and that the
existing work force is a beneficiary of new employment opportunities. Although in
practice it may be difficult to achieve, in theory one can assert that the range of new
jobs must include those which call upon established skills and those which provide
skills for new growth sectors; jobs that pay well and jobs that provide entry-level
access; jobs that build for the future and jobs that at least hold body and soul together
through the stressful present. No easy task! 41
4. Reindustrialization must start by building upon resources the community already
has. Although the wistful hope still lingers that a large (but of course nonpolluting)
firm will move into town and initiate a new era, most local leaders have come to
understand the futility of wasting limited resources on the vain, zero-sum game of
smokestack chasing.42 Industrial raiding parties in which chamber of commerce com-
mandos march off to Tokyo intending to capture a new Nikon or Sony factory rarely
succeed. Nor does it pay to go to North Carolina, Arkansas, or Texas in an attempt to
woo back old plants. In fact, as early as the 1970s, researchers recognized that spinoffs
and in-place expansion resulted in a far greater increase in jobs than did "cross-state"
or "into-state" expansions.43 In addition, there is growing awareness that some kinds of
development create more problems than they solve. Our research and professional proj-
ects validate the belief that strengthening and fostering growth among existing local
firms not only offers a significant likelihood of benefit, but also is likely to result in
the expansion of industrial activities that are compatible with the character and resources
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of the host community. A first step is to seek out the owners and chief executive
officers (CEOs) of local firms and work with them to identify and alleviate problems
that dampen their prospects for prosperity. Related analysis can disclose opportunities
for the local community to meet supply and service needs that are currently filled
from outside.
A second step is to identify and interview local entrepreneurs and potential entrepre-
neurs who would like to start new companies. Our research shows that people who go
into business for themselves set up shop close to home.44 Thus, identifying and remov-
ing obstacles to business start-ups will bear fruit locally.
Once the local owners and would-be owners of businesses have reported their experi-
ences and needs, the community must then mobilize its support system for economic
development. Projects like the Governor's Task Force on Economic Development for
the Northern Berkshires underscore the fact that no matter how dismal a community's
prospects may appear, there are resources to call upon. Educational and training
support can come from public and private educational institutions: kindergarten
through high school, higher education, technical training, and adult education can
separately and together provide basic educational skills, preparation for the world of
work, retraining, specialization, and technical skills. Educational institutions are also
major employers and purchasers, and educators can lead the way toward correcting
negative, self-defeating attitudes. The local banking community can play a major role in
teaching local business people how to access traditional loan sources; in constituting
innovative forms of financing, such as loan and venture capital pools; and in tapping
into the numerous state programs for financing reindustrialization. The human-services
system and municipal policies and procedures can be streamlined and made more
responsive. "One-stop shopping" is a useful objective, whether for a laid-off worker
searching for unemployment-related benefits and retraining programs or for the
potential owner of a new business who is looking for land, capital, zoning information,
and building permits. Once local strengths have been spotted, one can work to build on
them. Once impediments to growth have been identified, one can work to remove
them.
In towns that have bottomed out and are on their way back up, it may be sufficient
to foster local strengths and alleviate local obstacles to growth. In towns that are still
declining, however, this strategy will not suffice. Industrial activity, especially new
industrial activity, results when individual people become entrepreneurs and assume
the risks involved in investing in or starting a new business, or moving, expanding, or
otherwise altering an existing business. Communities that are "on the ropes" are
shrouded in a self-defeating and deadening malaise. In these communities, reindustrial-
ization efforts will have to reach individuals and motivate them to take the risks, both
personal and financial, involved in change. The prospects of the community must be
promoted to local citizens in order to spark the personal risk taking and collaborative
efforts essential to reindustrialization. Slogans like "Ware: The Town That Can't Be
Licked" and projects like the Heritage Parks in Lynn, Gardner, Holyoke, and North
Adams are examples of internal promotion. To be effective, such promotion must grow
out of a clearly articulated consensus of a community's character and special attributes.
The promotion effort must also be tied to a support system that fans promising sparks
of new activity into life.
5. Successful local promotion and mobilization can be followed with successful
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marketing to the outside. A locally generated resurgence of industrial activity will be
the most effective marketing tool. The same mobilization of support systems which
fosters the birth and growth of local firms will attract firms from outside the commu-
nity. In fact, without this support system in place, external marketing tends to be futile,
owing to ineffective or nonexistent follow-up of marketing leads.
Marketing theory lays great stress on the importance of "positioning," that is, on the
forceful assertion of a special niche.45 A ringing, reality-based statement of an indus-
trial community's essential character and special attributes stakes out its market posi-
tion. An articulate definition of the support systems and the quality of life offered by
the community will attract the desired decision maker, whether he or she is a single
entrepreneur or sits on an expanding firm's board of directors.
6. Once the ^industrialization plan has been formulated, state and federal sources
of assistance can be tapped. When assistance is sought before a solid strategy has been
formulated, the result is grantsmanship, not planning. In practice, a small town's attempt
to dip into the alphabet soup of state programs by shaping its request in terms of what
it understands the selection criteria to be produces a hastily conceived, noncompetitive
proposal that may do more harm than good. Even a "simple" application consumes a
large proportion of the volunteer and staff time that is in such short supply. Grant
hunting, at best, tends to result in sporadic, uncoordinated expenditures of funds and
effort. At the local level, there is also a suspicion— not altogether unfounded— that
once a state grant has been awarded, a community's problems are just beginning, owing
to the administrative requirements of the grant. The outcome may be that communities,
especially in small towns, just stop applying for grants. In some cases, industrial-
financing monies earmarked for small towns have not been spent because so few com-
munities applied for them!
State and federal assistance certainly can supply a vital infusion of support at key
points in the reindustrialization process. However, requests for assistance are increas-
ingly being evaluated by the administering agency according to whether or not the pro-
posed project supports a coherent overall plan. From the local point of view, a clear
plan of action is necessary for shaping outside programs to fit local needs and for
making competition for government money worth the effort.
Summary
From a bottom-up perspective, there is obvious cause for concern regarding the future
of mature industries in Massachusetts. They will continue to decline, and many of the
towns in which they are housed will suffer. Perhaps most important, there is little that
the mature-industry town, by itself, can do to help slow the decline. State government,
on the other hand, can assist in several ways with future industrial development.
First, it can help communities maintain and enhance their infrastructure systems.
The problems that currently exist are well beyond the abilities of most mature-industry
communities to resolve. Given the collapse and/or cutback of most federal infrastructure
grants, expansion has slowed to a virtual halt. If the state is to help revive these com-
munities, the basic assets needed to attract new industry must be in place. At present,
they are not, and they are increasingly less likely to be unless state aid is provided. In
short, an infrastructure bank is critical.46
Second, there is a need for speculative investments in mature-industry communities.
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For example, firms that are thinking of locating in North Adams view the lack of a
limited access north-south highway as a major liability. And yet state policy dictates
that existing, not potential, transportation demand determines whether highway im-
provements are made. Thus, there is a catch 22: North Adams needs an improved
highway if it is to attract industry, but state policy dictates the city must attract industry
before a highway is built. Providing funds in anticipation of growth could benefit these
communities.
Another example centers upon mothballing. Historically, this term applied to the
process used by the navy to preserve its ships during long periods of inactivity. In this
case, it applies to the protection of old buildings. Too often, a mill owner, once a major
tenant leaves, will cut back on heat, sprinkler operations, maintenance, and insurance.
As a result, within a short time these facilities begin to decay, often to the point where
they are unusable. Clearly, the preservation of these structures is in the state's best
interest. A policy of financial assistance to the owners of large vacant structures for the
purposes of maintenance would enable these structures to be better used at a later
time. In short, such a policy would buy time for the communities while ensuring that
one of their major economic assets had at least the potential to recover.
Third, a stronger relationship is needed between the state and growth firms with re-
spect to the training needs of technical workers. It is ironic, as Lester Thurow has noted,
that "alone among industrialized nations the United States does not have a system of
skill training for the non-college bound." 47 What is meaningful training? Simply
stated, it is the provision of skill development for the non-college-bound young worker
and of retraining for the displaced worker to meet the needs of growth industries. Mas-
sachusetts has made definite progress in meeting this need. However, to date, the ef-
forts have been reactive (usually due to plant closings) or too small to have a major
impact.
Fourth, there is a need for pinpointed regional strategies. Massachusetts is a very
small state. At the same time, it has several distinct economic regions. For example,
the economic problems of the northern Berkshire s, the Northern Tier, and the Black-
stone region are considerably different from those of Greater Boston and Cape Cod.
Until there are specially articulated programs to assist in the reindustrialization of
these unique areas, little change will result. (A note of caution is in order here: one
should not use an apparently low unemployment rate as a figure of relative prosperity.
Workers in these regions are finding jobs by commuting to growth areas. The fact
remains, however, that these once-prosperous regions are still shedding jobs.) These
programs should emphasize special financial incentives for land assemblage and build-
ing preservation and for companies desiring to locate in these areas, as well as the
creation of the aforementioned speculative approaches and retraining programs.
Fifth, increased state assistance is needed to mate mature industries with high tech-
nology. The aforementioned proposals designed to assist the furniture industry in
Gardner and the plastics industry in Leominster could be applied, for example, to our
paper makers and tool and die manufacturers. These efforts should not be viewed as
"retrograde operations." Rather, the perspective should be that we have skilled and
creative workers who, through the application of high technology, could become
gainfully employed in firms that could compete in a world market.
Finally, the state must recognize that change is inevitable and that its industrial base
will constantly shift. Our grandparents grew up with the idea that there would always
be jobs in shipbuilding, shoe making, textiles, and paper manufacturing. Our parents
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grew up thinking that our electronics and plastics firms would provide a lifetime
employment base. Our brothers and sisters are now looking for long-term security in
high-technology firms. The fact is that we constantly shed jobs, and, if anything, the
pace of change will increase. What this points to is the need to recognize that company
closings, job flight, and job displacement will be occurrences that are part of a world
market system. Propping up a machine shop with a typical $11.00 per hour worker who
competes with a Pacific Rim worker earning $1.00 per hour makes no sense. We need
to strip away our perception of permanence with respect to our large industries. They
will leave, not out of spite, but because of economic forces. And they should. We can
already note, for example, that computer-related high-technology employment is no
longer growing in the state, and, further, that companies located in Massachusetts are
employing fewer and fewer manufacturing workers.48 At the same time, we can begin
to see the increasing growth and development of new biotechnology firms. In fact,
greater Boston has, in less than a decade, become a world center for biotechnology
work.49 The shedding of old firms, combined with the instability of maturing firms and
the birthing of new companies, is a recipe for turmoil and anguish. And yet it will
remain part of our economic diet for years to come. The shedding of industry points to
the need to constantly reinforce innovation and creativity at our universities, technical
schools, laboratories, and centers for research and development. It also means that we
need to accept shedding as a way of life. We cannot bring back the past, but we can
prepare for the future.
The implementation of all these recommendations will help to create a climate that
is supportive of reindustrialization. The process is painful, and it will often take a long
time to see results. In fact, in one of our communities, it has taken five years before
positive change has begun to occur. There are few examples of win-win in these com-
munities. It is usually the older workers who are hurt the most. The fact remains that
we have little choice. Either we plan or we are planned upon.
Where will this end? We don't know. We do know that high-tech growth has leveled
off; that some companies are no longer growing in the region; and that recent months
have seen major declines in profits and resulting layoffs among last year's stars. We
also know that once an industry becomes labor intensive, as high technology appears
to be, it will no longer expand in New England and may even relocate to the Pacific
Rim. Tomorrow we may have a whole host of new communities that need the same
attention that the mature-industry towns need now. Of course, there are robotics,
genetics, and fiber optics . . .
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Appendix A
Communities Examined
The following chart summarizes our research and planning work in forty Massachusetts cities
and towns that once had, and may still have, a mature industrial base. While our research did
not always focus solely on industrial activities, we did examine the state of the industrial base in
each community and the problems and prospects with regard to same. The descriptions in the
Industrial Status column are explained in the beginning of the article. The comments at the end
of each entry are an attempt to succinctly point out a critical factor influencing the current
condition of industry in each community.
The contracts for our work were undertaken by LandUse, Inc., and Mullin Associates and for
the most part were locally funded. We also received some state contracts, particularly for our
work in the northern Berkshires and as part of a statewide infrastructure study. The grants were
awarded by the University of Massachusetts Center for Economic Development and Center for
the Environment and by the Healey Foundation.
Massachusetts Communities Analyzed









































13. Gleasondale Infrastructure Grant, Stable
Commonwealth of
Massachusetts
Old industries are leaving, and few
industries are relocating here.
Adams's location is distant from
interstate routes.
Athol has been devastated by the
collapse of the machine-trades
business.
Despite recovery, industrial uses
are now tending toward
warehousing and distribution.
This beautiful town has thousands
of square feet of vacant mill space.
Cabot Mills are at capacity; the
Uniroyal complex is vacant.
Clinton is in transition. Some new
industries are located here, but the
town is still in decline.
Kendall Mills are beyond recovery
for industrial uses.
EastCo Corporation recently
closed; tool making is in decline.
Erving Paper is still investing in the
community.
Fitchburg's industrial base is
changing. Traditional firms are
leaving; there has been some
replacement. The city has an
excellent promotion program.
Franklin is now a high-tech center,
owing primarily to location, land,
and promotion. The services sector
is increasing, however.
Gardner's new industrial park is
almost full, and its chair industry is
due to be revitalized.
Gleasondale is a home for small
industries.
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The town is healthy, but its
industrial base is in decline, owing
to the collapse of the machine
trades.
Hartwick's old mills are heavily
underutilized and/or vacant.
Holyoke has some new industry,
although its old industries are in
decline. There is pressure to
convert its mills to commercial/
residential use.
Because of its location and strong
promotional activities, Hudson is
booming.
Its strong labor force, strong
industrial orientation, and great
location make Lawrence a prime
site for further activity.
Leominster's plastics industry
remains relatively healthy.
Lowell's recovery has been fueled
by its infrastructure, labor, land,
and promotion, and by Wang Labs.
Ludlow Mills are largely vacant or
used for storage, and are managed
by an absentee landlord.
Marlboro's recovery has been
stimulated largely by its proximity
to Route 495. A major shift toward
the service sector is in process.
Maynard is the home of the Digital
Equipment Corporation.
Milford's recovery has been fueled
largely by its excellent location and
infrastructure. A major shift is
taking place toward the service
sector.
The collapse of its tool and die
industry, with only minor replace-
ment, has caused the town's
decline.
The major industrial building in
Monroe is beyond salvage.
Monson's decline is due largely to
the collapse of the Church Seat
Company.
The pullout of the Sprague
Corporation was devastating.
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Community How Researched Industrial Status Comment
29. Northampton Incubator Industry Stable
Contract
30. Orange Studio Project— Declining
Regional Planning
Program




33. Three Rivers Healey Grant



























There is no room here for industrial
development; the old mills have
been converted to nonindustrial
use.
As Athol goes, so goes Orange.
There are some hints of recovery,
however.
Southbridge's status is due largely
to the decline of its optical
industry.
The old industrial base is still
strong. Templeton is increasingly a
bedroom town.
The paper mill remains prosperous.
The old mills are heavily
underutilized.
Uxbridge's decline is due in part to
poor zoning, but the greatly
expanded Route 146 has infused
great hope.
Waltham's traditional industries
have virtually all been replaced.
Ware is increasingly a bedroom
community; its old mills are only a
shadow of their former selves.
West Springfield's industrial uses
are in decline; the town is
prosperous but is being converted
into a commercial center.
Westfield's machine trades are in
decline.
Whitinsville Works are now filling





Record Type 1: Introductory Information
1. Name of company:
2. Name of person being interviewed:
3. Rank in company:
4. Telephone number:
5. Address of company:
6. Date of interview:
7. Case ID #:
Record Type 2: History of Company
1. What prompted formation of the company?
a. new product e.
b. general business experience f.
c. pullout of previous firms g.
d. spinoff h.
2. Where was the business started?
a. in town
b. within 50 miles of town





d. > 200 miles from town
e. other
f. not applicable
3. Where did the founder live at the time of start-up?
a. in town
b. within 50 miles of town
c. within 50-200 miles of town
d. > 200 miles from town
e. not applicable
4. When was business started?




5. Major skill of founder:
a. machine operation
b. experience with product or service
c. machine design/redesign
d. marketing/sales/management
6. First customers (location):
a. in town
b. within 50 miles of town
c. within 50-200 miles of town
d. nationwide
e. 10-15 years ago
f. > 15 years ago







7. First type of customer and size (SIC code and relatively small or relatively large):
8. First financing:
a. owner
b. owner and bank
c. stock
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10.
11.
Major problem when starting:
a. financial
b. marketing and sales
c. product development
d. labor
















e. bought own place
f. lower cost
g. better location
13. Why is the company still in town?
a. community roots
b. close to market
c. close to supplies
d. labor force
e. cost of leaving vs. staying
f. quality of life
g. other
h. not applicable




















Record Type 3: Management and Marketing
Who performs the following services (questions 1 through 8)?
1 R&D
a. self and family
b. full-time employee
c. part-time employee
d. contract out in town
e. corporate level




a. self and family
b. full-time employee
c. part-time employee
d. contract out in town
e. corporate level
f. contract outside town
g. other
h. not applicable
a. self and family
b. full-time employee
c. part-time employee
d. contract out in town
e. corporate level





a. self and family
b. full-time employee
c. part-time employee
d. contract out in town
e. corporate level




a. self and family
b. full-time employee
c. part-time employee
d. contract out in town
e. corporate level




a. self and family
b. full-time employee
c. part-time employee
d. contract out in town
e. corporate level




a self and family
b. full-time employee
c. part-time employee
d. contract out in town
e. corporate level




a. self and family
b. full-time employee
c. part-time employee
d. contract out in town
e. corporate level
f. contract outside town
g. other
h. not applicable
How is company managed (questions 9 through 13)?
9. Who manages day to day?
a. self and family
b. foreman/mid-level management
c. department
d. contract out in town
e. corporate level
f. contract outside town
g. other
h. not applicable
10. Who makes policy decisions?
a. self and family
b. foreman/mid-level management
c. department
d. contract out in town
e. corporate level





Who cultivates new business?
a. self and family
b. foreman/mid-level management
c. department
d. contract out in town
e. corporate level
f. contract outside town
g. other
h. not applicable
12. Who has new ideas?
a. self and family
b. foreman/mid-level management
c. department
d. contract out in town
e. corporate level
f. contract outside town
g. other
h. not applicable
13. Who handles major problems?
a. self and family
b. foreman/mid-level management
c. department
d. contract out in town
e. corporate level
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14. Do you have a formal or informal chain of command?
a. formal c. other (specify)
b. informal d. not applicable
15. Do you have a business plan?
a. yes
b. no
16. If yes, is the business plan written?
a. written c. not applicable
b. not written
17. If there is a plan, what is the timeline?
a. < 1 year d. 3-4 years
b. 1 year e. 5 years +
c. 2 years f. not applicable
18. How often do you prepare financial statements?
a. monthly d. semiannually
b. quarterly e. other
c. annually
Record Type 4: Employee Information
1. Total number of employees:
2. Current number of full-time employees:
3. Current number of part-time employees:
4. Current number of seasonal employees:
5. Change in number of full-time employees since 1979:
a. net increase c. no change
b. net decrease d. not applicable
6. Change in number of part-time employees since 1979:
a. net increase c. no change
b. net decrease d. not applicable
7. Change in number of seasonal employees since 1979:
a. net increase c. no change
b. net decrease d. not applicable
8. Change in number of full-time employees since spring of 1983:
a. net increase c. no change
b. net decrease d. not applicable
9. Change in number of part-time employees since spring of 1983:
a. net increase c. no change
b. net decrease d. not applicable
10. Change in number of seasonal employees since spring of 1983:
a. net increase c. no change
b. net decrease d. not applicable
11. Average hourly wage (amount or range):
12. Number of employees that live in town:
28
13. Number of employees that live outside town:
14. Educational background of most employees:
a. high school
b. technical or trade school
c. some college












































f. wide range of ages
18. Percentage of employees that are male:
19. Percentage of employees that are female:
20. Percentage of employees that are married:
21. How did your employees come to work for you?
a. advertisement
b. personal recommendation
c. through high school
d. word of mouth
e. unemployment office
f. other (specify)
22. Where are they from?
in town
within 50 miles of town
within 50-200 miles of town
other
23. What is the most common reason that employees give for leaving your company?
a. higher pay
b. take a job where there is a union
c. work for themselves
d. layoff








24. When employees leave your company, where do they go?
a. back to school
b. another company of approximately e. leave area
same size f. don't know
c. larger company g. other (specify)
d. start their own company h. not applicable
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e. sales and marketing
f. basic math/English
g. mechanical ability













2. Exterior square footage:
3. Percentage of space used for offices:
4. Percentage of space used for sales:
5. Percentage of space used for production:
6. Percentage of space used for warehouse:
7. Does the company own or rent facilities?
a. own
b. rent
8. If rent, why did company choose to rent?
a. lack money to buy
b. keep assets liquid





9. If rent, what is the rent per square foot including utilities?
10. If rent, what is the rent per square foot without utilities?
Record Type 6: Relationship to Local Economy (Products/Services)
1. Current products/services (SIC codes):
2. What percentage of the company's business is wholesale?
3. What percentage of the company's business is retail?
4. What percentage of the company's business is subcontract?
5. Who are your major customers (type and size)?
6. Location of major customers:
a. in town
b. within 50 miles of town




(If haven't mentioned any) Are there any local customers?
a. yes c. not applicable
b. no
8. Who are the company's major suppliers (type and size)?
9. Location of major suppliers:
a. in town
b. within 50 miles of town












Who are your major competitors (type, size)?
11a. Foreign competition:
12. Location of major competitors:
a. in town
b. within 50 miles of town




13. Percentage of supplies transported to you by road:
14. Percentage of supplies transported to you by rail:
15. Percentage of supplies transported to you by air:
16. Percentage of products you market transported by road:
17. Percentage of products you market transported by rail:
18. Percentage of products you market transported by air:






20. Does the company have any patents?
a. yes
b. no
f. sales and management
g. site specific
h. other (specify)
i. no competitive advantage
c. not applicable




Record Type 7: Financial Information








city sources (UDAG, CDBG, other)
state sources (IRB, MTDC, other)
federal sources (SBA, other)
other (specify)
What percentage of equipment did the company buy new?
What percentage of equipment did the company buy used?
What percentage of equipment did the company build or rebuild itself?
If owned, what is the assessed value of your facilities (property and building)?
a. less than $50,000 e. $500,000 to $1 million
b. $50,000 to $100,000 f.
c. $100,000 to $250,000 g.
d. $250,000 to $500,000 h.
$1 million to $10 million
more than $10 million
don't know
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Record Type 8: Problems and Assistance
1. Does your location cause you any problems?
a. yes
b. no










3. Describe other problems with structure, if any:
a. energy inefficient








4. Describe problems with land, if any:
a. too small






5. Describe problems with neighbors/compatibility, if any:
a. vandals-safety d. no problem
b. neighbor complaints e. other
c. amenities-image f. not applicable
6. Describe problems with transportation, if any:
a. major routes far away e. no problem
b. lack public transportation f. other
c. lack RR-truck service g. not applicable
d. road-bridge conditions
7. Describe problems with access-egress, if any:
a. loading-dock problem e. no plowing
b. access to site f. no problem
c. traffic g. other
d. streets incompatible h. not applicable
8. Describe problems with zoning, if any:
a. nonconforming use e. no problem
b. signage restrictions f. other
c. other restrictions g. not applicable
d. expansion capability
9. Do you have any labor difficulties?
a. yes
b. no











11. Do you have any marketing difficulties?
yes
no
12. If yes, is the difficulty with:
a. general economic times
b. need more/new customers
c. need to enlarge market geographically
d. competition
e. poor market analysis
f. other
g. not applicable
13. What changes, if any, have you noticed in your market?
14.
a. local/regional population decline i. customers out of busines
b. increased demand J. change in customers
c. decreased demand k. less competition
d. steady market I. foreign imports
e. fluctuating market m . none
f. increased public contracts n. other
g- decreased public contracts o. not applicable
h. increased competition
What are you doing about these changes?
a. diversifying product line f. expanding geographically
b. increasing sales/advertising efforts g- cutting costs
c. R&D h. nothing
d. increasing production/sales staff i. other
e. decreasing production/sales staff J- not applicable
15. Is the company profitable?
a. yes
b. marginally profitable




d. interest rates from banks
e. insurance rates or coverage
c. not profitable
f. overhead
g. cost of supplies
h. none
i. other




d. interest rates from banks
e. insurance rates or coverage
f. overhead
g. cost of supplies
h. none
i. other
18. Describe contact with SBA:
a. no contact
b. satisfactory
c. too much paperwork
d. loan request too small
e. too expensive
f. other problems
19. Describe contact with Federal Extension:
a. no contact c. unsatisfactory
b. satisfactory d. other
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20. Have you had contact with other federal agencies?
a. yes
b. no
21. Describe contact with Department of Commerce:
a. no contact c. unsatisfactory
b. satisfactory d. other
22. Describe contact with MlFA:
a. no contact
b. satisfactory
23. Describe contact with MTDC:
a. no contact
b. satisfactory
24. Describe contact with SBDC:
a. no contact
b. satisfactory









26. Describe contact with City Hall/Economic Development Office:
a. no contact
b. satisfactory






28. Have you had contact with other local agencies?
a. yes
b. no
d. doesn't serve interests
e. too expensive, time-consuming
f. other
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